A critical analysis of anti-democratic narratives in Armenia

Foreign interference in elections: recurring patterns

The use of digital information technologies before elections by both domestic and foreign actors is reaching ever greater proportions and becoming a bigger threat to democracy around the world. Targeting of democracy can manifest itself through hacking, online “trolling” campaigns (which threaten, label, and harass individuals or groups), as well as large-scale disinformation and propaganda campaigns that use bots and fake social media accounts to spread false, misleading, biased, or inflammatory messages.[1]

Other countries and actors may use these methods in cooperation with various domestic actors. A number of politicians and media platforms spread misleading, propagandist, and polarizing narratives coming from external forces. It should also be noted that although in many cases external forces try to support a domestic force or party during elections, their goal is often also to simply undermine people’s trust in democratic institutions and in each other, to increase polarization and heighten social disagreements.[2]

In recent years, a number of post-Soviet countries (such as Moldova and Georgia), which have chosen the path of European integration and downscaling of Russian influence, seem to be confronted with the use of a wide range of these tools, including the spread of disinformation and manipulation on social media, opaque political financing, and cyberattacks. The examples of recent elections in these countries best illustrate the extent of Russian interference in elections, aimed at maintaining or expanding its influence, as well as the toolkit used by Russia to achieve that goal.

Propaganda mechanisms used by Russia are multi-layered and complex. They use a variety of disinformation and propaganda tools to influence public opinion and political discourse, as well as to consolidate their position in the region based on their own interests.[3]

Pro-Russian oligarchs from Moldova were one of the main tools used by Russia during the Moldovan elections.[4]

One of the main mechanisms for interfering in elections through the oligarchic network was vote buying. Moldovan police and media uncovered a vote-buying scheme worth more than $39 million, carried out through Ilan Shor’s networks and distributed to voters through territorial officials, precinct coordinators. This process was coordinated through Telegram bots, and the number of beneficiaries exceeded 300,000, which indicates an extensive foreign intervention.[5]

In addition to oligarchs and pro-Russian parties used to directly influence public opinion and elections, the Orthodox Church of Moldova is also one of the major instruments of Russian influence. About 80 percent of the population of Moldova is a follower of the Metropolitanate of Chisinau and All Moldova, which is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The church is also one of the institutions enjoying the highest level of public trust in Moldova (68.9% of respondents have a high level of trust in the church).[6]  Obviously, this means that the church also has a great influence on the socio-political life of the country. It is overtly critical of the current government of Moldova and its policies. For example, in 2021, after Maia Sandu won the election, some clergymen of the Moldovan church turned to their leader, Bishop Marchel, asking to be released from the obligation to pray for the country’s new leadership and to prohibit them from entering churches and participating in church services.[7]

The 2024 elections in Georgia also had a major impact on the future geopolitical landscape of the country. Georgia received EU membership candidate status in December 2023, and projections showed that in the event of re-election of the Georgian Dream party, Georgia’s European orientation could be completely reversed, returning the country to the Russian sphere of influence.

The Georgian Dream party adopted the “foreign agents” law in May 2024, which was essentially a replication of the relevant law adopted by the Kremlin. According to the law, if 20% or more of an organization’s funding comes from abroad, they are required to register as “foreign agents.” This was yet another step shrinking the space for civil society activities before the elections, testifying to pressures and restrictions on freedoms.[8]

The Media Development Foundation conducted a study of anti-Western discourse in the months leading up to the election, revealing a number of recurring narratives coming from the ruling party, its allies, and pro-Russian actors. For example, the West, the EU, and local NGOs were accused of interfering in Georgia’s elections, preparing the ground for revolution, and using the country’s president and opposition as European agents. The West was also accused of “propaganda of homosexuality” and “targeting national” values ​​and the church. In this context, the Georgian Dream adopted the Law on Family Values, positioning itself as a defender of traditions.[9]

Research methodology

The research underlying this analysis aims to uncover anti-democratic narratives and rhetoric in the media ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections, paying attention to the discourse framework as well as recurring patterns in local and broader contexts. These narratives are usually actively circulated with the aim of influencing public opinion and the results of upcoming elections.

From the 16 news websites that we considered based on their broad audience and ties with opposition forces (Armlur.am, News.am, Sputnik Armenia, Tert.am, 168.am, 24News.am, AraratNews.am, Mamul.am, Armenia24.live, Politik.am, 5TV.am, Alternativ.am, Hraparak.am, AlphaNews.am, Euromedia24.com, Fact-Check.am) the Euromedia24 and Fact-Check.am news websites were selected for monitoring, taking into account the scope of the research and time constraints.

Their choice was mainly related to the circumstance that media platforms are often created shortly before the elections (often with Russian ties) and make references to Western or European symbolism or names, while being openly engaged in promoting anti-democratic narratives. At the same time, the interview with a media expert was a guiding principle for us in the selection process.

Fact-Check.am, which only became active in 2025, and poses as a fact-checking platform, and Euromedia24, which poses as an international media outlet and operates in Armenia, were interesting sources for the study of narratives articulated in the context of the elections. However, Fact-Check.am ceased operations in August, removing all content from both its website and social media platforms. Instead, the AlphaNews website, whose editor-in-chief is Tigran Kocharyan, an active opposition figure, was selected for monitoring.
On both news websites, the selection of guests and the scope of discussion of topics are limited by certain filters related to the funding and ideological orientation of the media outlets. Thus, the overwhelming majority of guests are experts and politicians with a pronounced oppositional stance. In the second phase of monitoring, some of the guests interviewed on political scientist Gevorg Melikyan’s “StatusQuo” analytical program series are representatives of various politically active forces. But again, they all represent the opposition camp. The AlphaNews website often conducts interviews in Russian, with so-called experts from Russia.

Obviously, the choice of these media outlets limits the study of pre-election rhetoric to ideas circulating mainly in the opposition field. While acknowledging this limitation, it is important to take into consideration that the radical opposition in particular does not claim to defend democracy and does not act accordingly. At the same time, a critical look shows that from the perspective of a more healthy, stronger and even radicalized democracy, our situation, where democracy remains exclusively on the agenda of the government, contains inherent risks.

The video interview format was selected by the research team because both the format and the selection of interviewees allow for a more comprehensive and in-depth study of the existing discourse. A total of 34 interviews were observed.

Media monitoring was conducted in two phases: from June 1 to 30, and from October 15-31, 2025. Interviews published on the websites of both media outlets during the specified period were selected as research material, focusing on video interviews with politicians, party representatives, analysts, or other political actors.

We also conducted five expert interviews with civil society representatives to identify perceptions of democratic institutions, the threats they face, anti-democratic narratives, including those coming from the government, as well as actions the civil society can take ahead of the elections.

During the selected period, the conflict between the government and the church, as well as the arrest of Samvel Karapetyan, were in the center of domestic political developments. In the second phase of monitoring, these two events and the related developments remained central on the monitoring platforms, and the events that occurred during that period, such as the arrest of the mayor of Gyumri and a number of other clergymen, continue to be discussed from the perspective that has already been formed around the previous events.
Adopting critical discourse analysis as a framework, we have studied the discourse in the media as part of social reality, which is formed within the context of that reality, at the same reproducing or transforming it. In this sense, discourse is both socially conditioned and socially constructive. It constructs situations, shapes “knowledge,” as well as the social identities of individuals and groups of individuals, as well as relationships between them. Discourse is constructive in two ways: both in the sense that it helps maintain and reproduce the existing social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to its transformation.

Because discourse is so socially significant (impactful), it raises important issues related to power. Discursive practices can have significant ideological implications. Depending on how they present situations and position people, they can contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between different groups (e.g., social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities).[10]

This approach by Fairclough allows us to view the media as an institution that contributes to the reproduction of discourse and social practice “through overt and covert policies.”[11]

The conspiracy theory that Nikol Pashinyan and his government are agents of other countries and forces and have come to power in Armenia to carry out their “plans” runs like a scarlet thread in most interviews. This narrative often branches out into various sub-narratives, the most prevalent of which is that they have a secret deal or are somehow dependent on Turkey and Azerbaijan. For example, one of the guests noted that Pashinyan felt “at home” in the Constantinople Mosque. At the same time, it is emphasized that these and other actions raise doubts about his political, national, and spiritual priorities, suggesting that Pashinyan is closer to the Turkish or other nations’ aspirations.[12] 

Citing the words of another source, an expert notes in one of the interviews:

There are two states, two nations: Turkish, Azerbaijani, and three regimes, namely Nikol Pashinyan’s regime, Erdogan’s regime, and Aliyev’s regime. In essence, this is reality. We can see it clearly today. The threat to these three regimes is the Diaspora, the opposition, and the Church.[13]

In another interview, the following is noted:

It is my deep conviction that Nikol Pashinyan has kinship relations with the Azerbaijani or Turkish authorities, and all its manifestations, namely, hatred towards the Republic of Armenia, the Armenian people, the Armenian Church and Artsakh, represent the same typical hatred that exists in Turkey and Azerbaijan.[14]

Within the same logic, a number of experts and politicians consider the authorities as “appointed” by the West or implementing their plans. For example, in an interview, opposition MP Anna Mkrtchyan describes the revolution as a power grab by the European Union and notes that Pashinyan “received power from outside.”[15]

Moreover, the authorities themselves are often involved in the same discourse (especially in the context of confrontation with certain clergymen), as a result of which it is continuously reproduced and legitimized in various political spheres, endangering the democratic culture. When political actors accuse various individuals, groups, or institutions of being agents without using specific criteria, rather than becoming an analytical category, it turns into a tool for denigration and delegitimization. Such linguistic practice takes political disagreements from the domain of argumentations, replacing them with conspiracy-based assumptions that do not require evidence but effectively instill distrust and fear. Even when evidence is presented, as was the case with the document published by the National Security Service, which revealed that Archbishop Ezras was a Russian KGB agent, much of the public debate continued to revolve around the idea that it was fabricated. Leaving aside the political intentions of different actors or the question of the authenticity of the document, it is obvious that this discourse undermines public and political trust, deepens the rift between different groups, contributes to apathy and cynicism, and shrinks space for discussing serious and complex issues.
Moreover, the instrumentalization of the discourse  of “agents” contributes to the securitization of public relations, presenting political competition and civic participation as a potential threat. In this setting, any criticism, independent journalism, or civic activism can easily be reframed as a manifestation of “external influence”, limiting and shrinking the public sphere and the boundaries of political action. As a result, the label “agent” loses its substantive meaning and turns into a mechanism of universal suspicion, which, rather than protecting the public interest, erodes trust and the foundations of democratic coexistence.

“The Stalin Era”

Another central narrative can be observed in almost all interviews, which is about the authorities establishing an authoritarian regime in Armenia. The conflict with the Church and the arrests of various clergymen and opposition figures are presented by many experts and opposition politicians as actions typical of authoritarian regimes, where Pashinyan’s goal is to suppress all centers of opposition, creating an atmosphere of fear in the country. Comparisons are often made with the Stalin era. It can also be observed that the narrative about relations with Turkey is intertwined with this narrative.

Persecutions of this scale happened in the Ottoman Empire, during the Genocide, when they arrested and killed people, and in the 1930s, during the Bolshevik era. More than 200 clergymen were arrested, many were killed. At present, those in power are followers of the Turkish-Bolshevik practices.[16]

At the same time, the narrative that Pashinyan is a dictator is combined with the narrative of him being a servant of the West. One politician notes that a “sultanic regime” has been established in Armenia and if the authorities had the opportunity, they would even behead people, but the West simply has not given them the green light.[17]
It should be noted that the arrests of clergymen and opposition figures are taking place in the context of statements by government representatives that a “hybrid war” has started against Armenia ahead of the elections.
In addition to the criticism by anti-government individuals and groups that “hybrid warfare” is a fabrication or a figment of imagination of the government, from a broader critical perspective it is important to emphasize that such concepts are characterized by conceptual stretching, [18] as a result of which a critical distance should be observed from these concepts and a framework for reflexive application should be established.

This means that at some point it loses its analytical boundaries and starts to be used with ex-post logic to bring together different, sometimes unrelated processes under one name. As a result, it no longer helps to make sense of specific strategies and toolkits used but turns into an explanatory framework that obscures contextual differences and the diversity of factors. At the same time, the excessive use of the term “hybrid warfare” contributes to the securitization of social and political processes, constantly presenting political disagreements, institutional crises, or resistances as externally governed threats. In this sense, “hybrid warfare” becomes a formulation that says everything and at the same time says nothing.

It can be observed that in both news outlets the issue is framed as part of Pashinyan’s plans as an agent to maintain power at all costs, neutralize other forces before the elections, destroy the Church, and even bring Armenia’s existence to an end.

It is worth noting that EuroMedia24 is making ostensible attempts to provide a platform for various forces active in the public sphere and pursue policies that promote pluralism. Unlike guests at AlphaNews, most of whom are so-called experts or politicians ideologically aligned with the former authorities or living in Russia and speaking Russian, EuroMedia24 also hosts representatives of the more neutral opposition.

Instrumentalization of the “other” in political struggle

 The targeting of Pashinyan is also carried out through attacks on a number of vulnerable groups and civil society. The rhetoric formed around civil society, the LGBT+ community, and “traditional values” serves as a moral evaluation tool to present Nikol Pashinyan and his political team as forces alien to national values, as morally compromised, thereby influencing public attitudes toward them.

One of the interviews mentions that Pashinyan’s party has been “lobbying” for the protection of LGBT persons in Armenia for years.

From the very beginning, the Civil Contract was engaged in protecting the rights of these groups: faggots, dykes, and their other derivatives. It is obvious that people belonging to that group are very close to Pashinyan’s heart.[19]

Such vocabulary used by an “expert” to describe the LGBTQ+ community contributes to the deepening of social fear and marginalization in society. As part of an anti-democratic narrative, it devalues ​​universal principles of human rights and justifies attacks on vulnerable groups.

At the same time, the fight against domestic violence is presented as a means of undermining Armenia’s “traditional values,” and is linked to Pashinyan’s government and European values:

It is evident that this government also targets the family. Two prominent representatives of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party, who have been providing funding for that party since 2013-14, two citizens of the United States and Canada, have been engaged in targeting our family values ​​in Armenia, destroying families, creating shelters under false pretenses, keeping children or one of the spouses in shelters, pretending to be caring for them. And I want to say that Pashinyan has been involved in these actions not since 2018, but since 2013-2014. [20]

The expert interprets the policy aimed at preventing domestic violence and the creation of shelters as a purposeful process of destroying families and introducing “foreign” values. Thus, initiatives against domestic violence are presented as a threat to national identity and traditional cultural foundations, and their implementation as evidence that Pashinyan is involved in this “harmful” agenda. This rhetoric is an example of how anti-democratic and conservative narratives are combined within the framework of “protecting traditional values” and “fighting foreign values”, aiming to discredit political opponents.

Similar rhetoric is also used in presenting Russia as a friendly country to Armenia, contrasting the traditional societies of Armenia and Russia with the European model.

What does the Western model say: if your husband hits you, you unconcernedly call the police… What does the Armenian model say: with love, through negotiating, with the help of relatives, if you have spiritual values, with the same spiritual values, with the family, the church, and all that, you try to solve it, and maybe the person will understand that he was wrong and usually they do, and the Armenian family used to survive for a long time. Moreover, many are able to redeem themselves by becoming a much better husband or wife.[21]

Once again, we see how violence is diminished and normalized, presented as a cultural peculiarity, and how legal mechanisms are presented as incompatible with “Armenian identity”. This rhetoric contributes to the reproduction of the patriarchal system, as well as politicizes the protection of women’s rights, linking it to the fight against “foreign values” and maintaining relations with Russia.

At the same time, when countering their critics, the government and their close circles often use the same homophobic language, thus using sexual orientation or gender identity as a tool to discredit the critic. Even more concerning is that this discourse could be perceived as an allegedly “defensive” reaction in response to the “provocations” by critics. However, in reality, the language of the government reproduces the homophobic linguistic and symbolic mechanisms through which the political culture of exclusion has been built for years.

Another way to discredit Pashinyan or criticize his relations with the West is to link him to civil society, thereby targeting civil society. This is not a new policy. Our study on anti-gender groups and discourse, conducted immediately after the revolution, clearly showed that in the post-revolutionary setting, members of anti-gender campaigns had been given the opportunity to play a more aggressive role, acting from a new, fully-fledged oppositional position. By turning sexuality and gender, and the progressive civil society that deals with these issues, into a target for speculations, misrepresentations, and conspiracy theories, they serve their main political goal of discrediting politicians associated with civic and human rights activities, as well as polarizing Armenian society on a sensitive topic like sexuality.[22]

To describe the interest of the US in Armenia in the past, one of the interview guests notes that millions of dollars were previously invested in the “so-called” civil society, creating a “Sorosian” network, Nikol Pashinyan operating with a “Sorosian” methodology. This narrative uses the label “Sorosian” to create a negative attitude towards civil society, a label that, as a result of years of discrediting campaigns, can be associated with the concept of serving the agenda of other countries in exchange for money. The label is obviously associated with Pashinyan, presenting him as part of the “Sorosian” network and, therefore, serving a foreign agenda. This allows to easily form an image of an “external enemy”, find associated “internal enemies”, and formulate a political narrative against them, blaming existing or fictional problems in the country on their “anti-statehood” activities.

These attacks on civil society became particularly active in the second phase of monitoring, after Daniel Ioannisyan filed a report against the Primate and priests of the Aragatsotn Diocese. In questions asked by journalists, one can sometimes observe attempts at presenting civil society as a tool used by the West to implement its “plan” in Armenia. According to this perspective, Pashinyan is a puppet of these forces, which is why he enjoys the support and protection of NGOs funded by them. Therefore, civil society representatives are presented as a “buffer zone” for the government, as they shelter the government with their views.

Thus, we can see how “traditional values” are being instrumentalized, and how the LGBT+ community and civil society are targeted to gain an advantage in the political struggle, at the same time deepening existing inequalities in society and reproducing patriarchal rhetoric.

Narratives related to Russia

In the discourse emerging around the causes of the conflict between Pashinyan and the church (and in that context, also Samvel Karapetyan), pro-Russian voices are particularly loud.

As already mentioned, the model of “traditional society” is presented as a universal value that justifies friendship with Russia, while the opposing “Western” values ​ are viewed as foreign to the Armenian people and “imported” from outside.

Another narrative observed in the interviews revolves around the idea that Pashinyan’s government seems to be distancing itself from Russia, instead deepening relations with Turkey. In one of the AlphaNews interviews, where the guest is a Russia-based TV presenter and the interview is in Russian, some of the questions are about whether Armenia’s path of rapprochement with the EU and distancing itself from Russia is not leading to closer relations with Turkey. According to another narrative, Armenia exists due to Russia’s military presence in the country. One of the guests notes that if Armenians find it difficult to imagine what would happen if the Russian military base were to be withdrawn from Gyumri, they can visit the Genocide Museum every day and remind themselves what fate could await Armenia as a result of such a policy. Such language reinforces the idea of ​​a bipolar geopolitical choice, according to which Armenia must remain with Russia, or it will be destroyed. It also condemns any pro-Western or foreign policy balancing move, presenting it as an agenda that aligns with that of historical enemies.

Changes in anti-democratic discourse over time

During the first phase of monitoring, one can often hear in interviews about the need to get rid of Pashinyan sooner rather than later. This is often followed by a call or an idea of ​​an action plan that would allow for a change of government before the elections.

Often, that action plan also involves the public. For example, in some of the interviews, it is a call to unite around Samvel Karapetyan and demonstrate political activism. In other cases, statements containing anti-democratic elements can be observed. For example, one interviewee states:

When they neutralize the opposition, they also neutralize all legitimate ways for a change of power in the country. In other words, they contribute to our society becoming even more radical, resorting to even more radical actions. Everything they fear, their physical safety, they contribute to the increase of those risks.[23]

In another interview, the guest claims that Armenia is under foreign rule, and Nikol Pashinyan’s government is a “collaborator” government with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Therefore, Armenia is occupied and should not be liberated through political struggle: a national liberation struggle is needed, readiness for self-sacrifice. 

When weeds have grown in your garden and taken over the garden, weeding will not help. You need to resort to other means; various pesticides can be useful. In our case, those pesticides should be decided by the leaders, weeding won’t help for sure.[24]

Although it is often not specified what tools the use of pesticides or the national liberation struggle implies, it is obvious that they promote the idea of ​​violent action.

The main justification for this is the allegation that the homeland is occupied, thereby delegitimizing the current government. One can often come across the phrases “the so-called government” or “there is no state” or that we cannot wait for elections because this government must be removed before 2026. Thus, a sense of urgency is being instilled and grounds for unconstitutional and anti-democratic actions are created.

Nevertheless, in the second phase of monitoring, such discourse was significantly softened and replaced by a mood of preparing for the elections. In this context, another problematic narrative emerges, one claiming that the upcoming elections will be rigged and manipulated by the ruling power, as in the cases of Moldova and Romania.

During interviews, it is often claimed that Pashinyan simply needs to win the elections, and he is ready for anything to achieve that goal. This is also in line with the logic of narratives linking the processes taking place in Armenia to the “outside”, to various external forces.

All of these technologies, directed from above by curators to produce a predetermined result, have been tested in many countries. Moldova and Romania have been vivid examples. In Armenia, they will also tell in advance who to elect, and all technologies will be used for that purpose. Those who should not be elected will either not be released from prison, or they will be put in prison; they will be removed from the race in advance, through statements that the documents for the nomination as candidates were not properly filled. If someone nevertheless runs in the elections and receives more votes, they will be removed after the vote count under false pretenses of having made violations, or the election results will be canceled. All of these means will be used; there is no doubt about that. No one will hand over power. That is why Pashinyan is favorably posing as a very tough leader. He has decided that he will be re-elected, so he will, and no one should doubt the toughness of the implementation of that plan.[25]

It can also be observed that regional changes, such as Sandu’s victory in the elections in Moldova, have their impact on local narratives in the context of the elections. The allegations of election fraud seem to be attempts to delegitimize elections, where the re-election of the current government would mean reaffirming predetermined results, rather than a result of the expression of the will of the people. And the ban on participation in elections of some opposition forces in Moldova and Romania and other restrictions are presented not in the context of a hybrid war with Russia, but, rather, as evidence of the involvement of the same external “forces” in all these countries.

Summary

Discourse analysis of the content published by the two media outlets showed that one of the key narratives circulated by the opposition is Pashinyan’s joint policy with the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan, which culminates in an allegation that Pashinyan is a foreign agent.  

The discourse targeting Pashinyan instrumentalizes civil society, the LGBT+ community, and “national traditional values,” contributing to the further targeting of vulnerable groups and the reproduction of patriarchal ideas and discourse. The protection of human rights is viewed as “externally imported” and opposed to true Armenian values, the latter surprisingly coinciding with Russian values.

In the first phase of monitoring, the elected government in Armenia and the electoral institution in general are delegitimized, and a sense of urgency is created to effect a change of government. In the second phase, however, the discourse related to the urgency is subdued, and opposition forces also adopt the approach of entering the pre-election campaign. At the same time, projections emerge that the upcoming elections will be rigged and some political parties will be repressed, introducing examples of countries where the authorities have repeatedly declared themselves targets of hybrid warfare by Russia as “evidence”.

A comparative analysis of interviews with experts shows that the current state of democracy in Armenia can be more accurately described not as an established institutional system, but as a political and social arrangement kept in times of crisis. Although Armenia is formally perceived as a democratic country, almost all experts point to the imperfect establishment and vulnerability of its institutions. The relative democracy is explained not so much by institutional robustness as by the demand for freedoms that society has developed since the revolution.
Against this background, experts see the biggest threat in the growing concentration of power, particularly around the prime minister, as well as in the practice of appointing loyalists, including in bodies that are designed to ensure the implementation of the mechanisms of checks and balances. This not only limits pluralism as a fundamental institution of democracy, but also gradually shrinks the space for real political debate within the government system. As a result, democracy is maintained not through internal balance, but at the expense of external pressures and the inert public demand.
At the same time, the narratives of delegitimization of the elections, spread by opposition media, do not have a significant impact on the public, they are largely marginal, since the technical legitimacy in terms of organizing elections and the voting process is largely ensured.

However, the issue has gradually shifted to the dimension of the significance of elections: citizens often do not see real choices and convincing political alternatives, which affects how they make sense of their own participation. In this regard, cases of abuse of administrative resources and selective pressure on opposition actors in the post-election phase are observed, especially in the regions, which deepens the political rather than technical layer of distrust surrounding the elections.
Risks related to the pre-election and post-election phases are associated with two main scenarios. In the first case, the risk is the gradual discrediting of the current government, the reduced effectiveness of political discourse, and as a result, the search for tougher mechanisms. Previously working discourses, such as the opposition between the “former” and “current” government, are gradually losing their mobilizing potential, and if the peace agenda does not become more tangible and persuasive, it may similarly be exhausted. This places the government in a position to formulate new narratives, but the question remains whether they have the capacity to do so. The second scenario is related to the possibility that forces not accepting democracy at the level of values and even openly opposing it may come to power, which is a systemic threat to the democratic regime.
Discursive analysis shows that the narratives by the government and the opposition are formed not only in the framework of domestic politics, but also under external influences. The main government narratives, namely, the peace agenda, the discourse on sovereignty and hybrid threats, as well as the de facto sole ownership of the democracy agenda, are viewed by experts as partially justified, but politically exaggerated. At the same time, the “hunt for agents” and the instrumentalization of compromising information can create an atmosphere of fear and hinder the emergence of new actors in the political arena.
The anti-democratic narratives prevailing among the opposition and circles close to the opposition are constructed around blaming the government for “Turkification”, external conspiracies, severing relations with Russia, as well as presenting democracy as a phenomenon that is “externally imported” and “contrary to national identity.” This discourse is often accompanied by anti-Western and anti-civil society positioning, which is not an independent ideological system per se, but a localized reproduction of narratives derived from official Russian positions. Civil society is a key, but at the same time vulnerable, actor in this entire domain. Its vulnerability is due to both financial dependencies and internal polarization and lack of consensus over values.

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[1]Tenove, C., Buffie, J., McKay, S., Moscrop, D., (January 16, 2018). Digital Threats to Democratic Elections: How Foreign Actors Use Digital Techniques to Undermine Democracy. Research Report, Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235819

[2] Ibid.

[3] Wilson, A. (June 30, 2025). The bear behind the ballot: Moldova’s election in the shadow of a war. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-bear-behind-the-ballot-moldovas-election-in-the-shadow-of-war/

[4] The most prominent among them is perhaps Ilan Shor, who was forced to leave the country in 2019 after another oligarch, Vlad Plahotniuc, was voted out of power. Along with several others, Shor was accused of stealing $1 billion (about 12% of Moldova’s GDP) from Moldovan banks through loans and financial fraud. Having moved to Israel and later having received Russian citizenship, Shor continues to be politically active in Moldova. As a result, in 2023, the Constitutional Court of Moldova declared the Shor party unconstitutional and suspended its activities. However, Shor formed the “Victory” alliance composed of a group of clone parties and forces established with his financial support over the years. Although the Central Electoral Commission prohibited them from participating in the 2024 EU membership referendum, they launched a massive disinformation campaign aimed at criticizing the pro-European agenda of the Sandu government and instilling distrust among the public towards the prospect of EU membership.

[5] Marandici, Ion. (2025, January). Oligarchs, Euroscepticism, and Russia’s Strategy in Moldova. DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000715250

[6] BTI Transformation Index. (2024). Moldova Country Report 2024. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/MDA

[7] Całus, K. (2023, April). The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions. Hybrid CoE Working Paper 23. https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230413-Hybrid-CoE-Working_Paper-23-Moldova-WEB.pdf

[8] Gasparyan, D., Wolkov, N., Kagan, F. W. (2024, October 21). Russia or the West: The Stake’s in Georgia’s Elections. Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-or-west-stakes-georgia%E2%80%99s-election

[9] European Digital Media Observatory. (2024, November 27). Anti-Western Propaganda and Disinformation Amid the 2024 Georgian Parliamentary Elections. https://edmo.eu/publications/anti-western-propaganda-and-disinformation-amid-the-2024-georgian-parliamentary-elections/

[10] Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical Discourse Analysis. In T. van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction (Vol. 2, pp. 258-284). London: Sage.

[11] Socioscope. (2023, February 13). War, Peace, and the Future in the Media: An Attempt at Critical Discourse Analysis. https://socioscope.am/archives/3655

[12] EuroMedia24. (2025, June 24). Pashinyan will one day announce that he is nationalizing the Sas Supermarket. This is unacceptable: Yesayan. https://www.euromedia24.com/hy/post/31609

[13] AlphaNews. (2025, June 26). Occupation, genocide – neither helped the Turks: It is the church that keeps us Armenian. Hovhannisyan.https://alphanews.am/okoupacia-cexaspanoutyoun-ays-ameny/

[14] AlphaNews. (2025, October 24). Pashinyan and Aliyev are conducting a joint anti-Russian campaign: Garnik Davtyan. https://alphanews.am/pashinyann-ou-alievy-zougordvac-hakaro/

[15] EuroMedia24. (2025, October 24). Where is Armenia heading? Anna Mkrtchyan (video). https://euromedia24.com/hy/post/43552

[16] EuroMedia. (2025, October 25). All of us may be wiretrapped, recorded։ These people recognize no sanctitities: Manvelyan (video). https://euromedia24.com/hy/post/43649

[17] EuroMedia. (2025, October 25). Karen Sarukhanyan’s mother-in-law organized a strike at the kindergarten. Arrests will continue (video). https://euromedia24.com/hy/post/43644

[18] Solmaz, T.(2022).‘Hybrid warfare’: A dramatic example of conceptual stretching. DOI: https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.23.1.5.

[19] EuroMedia24. (2025, June 10). Pashinyan will guide the sectarians to the Mother See: they have been instructed to get rid of the Patriarch (video). https://euromedia24.com/hy/post/30336

[20] EuroMedia24. (2025, June 10). Pashinyan will guide the sectarians to the Mother See: They have been instructed to get rid of the Patriarch (video). https://euromedia24.com/hy/post/30336

[21] AlphaNews. (2025, June 10). I highly doubt that those detained will be released in the near future: Ashot Avetisyan. https://alphanews.am/xist-kaskacoum-em-or-mot-apagayoum-kal/

[22] Socioscope. (2020, August 5)․ Anti-gender Campaigns, Rhetorics and Objectives in Post-Revolutionary Armenia. https://socioscope.am/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020_Anti-gender-campaigns_-research_Arm.pdf

[23] AlphaNews. (2025, June 26). Occupation, genocide – neither helped the Turks: It is the church that keeps us Armenian. Hovhannisyan. https://alphanews.am/okoupacia-cexaspanoutyoun-ays-ameny/

[24] AlphaNews. (2025, June 11). He destroyed the 5,000-year-old Artsakh: What is a 1,700-year-old church for him? Harutyun Harutyunyan. https://alphanews.am/5000-amya-arcaxy-ochnchacrec-1700-amya-ekexeci/

[25] AlphaNews. (2025, October 28). Armenia will sooner or later have to make a choice. Dmitry Suslov. https://alphanews.am/hayastany-vax-te-oush-stipvac-e-linelou/